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as well as access to health insurance varies between self-employed and wage and salary 
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the English Longitudinal Survey of Ageing (ELSA) we find that the higher labor force 
exit rate of wage and salary workers compared to self-employed workers is due to 
defined benefit pension incentives created by the public and private pension systems. 
Higher rates of labor force exit at ages 55 and older in England compared to the United 
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1.   INTRODUCTION 
According to data from the U. S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS), 14.2 million 
U. S. workers, or 10.5 percent of the workforce, were self-employed in unincorporated or 
incorporated businesses in 2001.  Since rates of self-employment rise with age, a 
disproportionate share of the self-employed is middle-aged or older workers.  Some of 
these older workers have been self-employed for much or all of their working careers 
while others have made the transition to self-employment later in their careers, often as 
part of the transition to retirement. Similar patterns exist among older workers in England 
where approximately one quarter of workers over age 60 are self-employed.  Self-
employment among older workers in both countries is likely to become more prevalent 
over time given the growing size of the older population and policy changes promoting 
work among older individuals. 
Despite the prevalence of self-employment at older ages, few studies examine the 
labor force transition patterns of older self-employed workers. Although self-employed 
workers are from both the bottom and top of the wealth distribution, they on average, 
hold more wealth than wage and salary workers yet tend to retire later than their wage 
and salary counterparts.   Understanding why self-employed workers are less likely to 
exit the labor force at older ages relative to their wage and salary counterparts may assist 
policy makers seeking to encourage later retirement ages.  The retirement decisions of 
older workers have implications for the adequacy of national savings rates and the 
solvency of social insurance programs such as Social Security in the United States.  
Moreover, countries differ in their treatment of the self-employed in pension and health 
insurance systems, and this variation can assist in our understanding of how institutions 
affect the labor force participation decisions of older workers.   
Table 1 shows self-employment rates by age among older workers for ten 
European countries, England, and the United States.  The table reveals substantial 
heterogeneity in self-employment rates across countries, ranging from just eight percent 
of 50-55 year old workers in Denmark to 36 percent of such workers in Greece.  The 
United States and England are in the middle of the range with 19 and 16 percent of 50-55 
year old workers in self-employment, respectively.  The table also illustrates how self- 
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employment rates rise dramatically with age, more than doubling by ages 65 and older in 
virtually every country.  For example, 26 percent of workers in Denmark are self-
employed by ages 65 and older, 62 percent are self-employed in Greece, 40 percent in 
England, and 37 percent in the United States.   
While some of the rise in self-employment with age is due to later-life transitions 
into self-employment, most of it is due to differential retirement rates between the self-
employed and wage and salary workers.  In many countries, public and private pension 
eligibility, as well as access to health insurance varies between self-employed and wage 
and salary workers, and these differences are likely to cause differential retirement 
patterns both within and across countries.  By exploiting variation in these institutional 
features within and across countries, we can explore the effect of policy parameters that 
often cannot be studied in a single country. 
In this paper, we examine how public and private pension and health insurance 
systems affect the retirement transitions of self-employed older workers compared to 
wage and salary workers.  We focus our analysis on the United States and England as 
these are the only countries of those shown in Table 1 for which the necessary panel data 
are currently available.  Specifically, we rely on longitudinal data from the Health and 
Retirement Study (HRS) in the United States and the English Longitudinal Survey of 
Ageing (ELSA).  These data sources have the advantage of comparable demographic, 
economic, and labor market data on workers in the two countries.   
We find that the higher labor force exit rate of wage and salary workers compared 
to self-employed workers is due to defined benefit pension incentives created by the 
public and private pension systems.  Higher rates of labor force exit at ages 55 and older 
in England compared to the United States are due in part to the availability of publicly 
provided health insurance. These findings underscore the importance of institutional 
features of the labor market in influencing individual retirement decisions.  They also 
suggest that in the United States, the availability of Medicare at age 65 limits the 
proportion of workers willing to work past 65 but that the movement of employers away 
from defined benefit pension plans is likely to encourage work at older ages.  
  3 
2.   PRIOR RESEARCH ON RETIREMENT AND SELF-EMPLOYMENT IN THE 
UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 
A substantial literature in the United States focuses on the determinants of 
transitions to retirement (for reviews, see Hurd, 1990a and Lumsdaine and Mitchell, 
1999).  Much of this literature is motivated by the trend in the postwar period toward 
early retirement in the United States, attributed, in part or wholly to the increased 
generosity of Social Security, notably the windfall gains during the 1960s and 1970s  
(Costa, 1998; Hurd and Boskin, 1984; Ippolito, 1990).  Recent evidence, however, 
indicates that labor force participation rates among older men have stabilized or even 
begun to increase (Quinn, 1999; Karoly and Panis, 2004). The timing of retirement is in 
part determined by the incentives embedded in the rules determining Social Security 
benefits, as well as employer-provided pension benefits (see Hurd, 1990b and Lumsdaine 
and Mitchell, 1999 for reviews and Anderson, Gustman and Steinmeier, 1999; Samwick, 
1998). In the United Kingdom, Meghir and Whitehouse (1997) also found that financial 
incentives to retire are strongly predictive of actual retirement behavior.   Likewise, other 
cross-national research published in a volume edited by Gruber and Wise (1999) notes 
that there is a strong negative correlation between labor force participation at older ages 
and the generosity of early retirement benefits.  This study also shows that even with the 
limited number of observations available in cross-national studies, the effects of 
institutions and policies are important enough to generate convincing results.   
The role of health status in affecting the timing of retirement has received 
extensive study, with most studies finding that workers in poor health are more likely to 
leave the labor force early (see the reviews by Sammartino, 1987, and Currie and 
Madrian, 1999).  There is less consensus regarding the magnitude of the effect which can 
vary with the health measure used and estimation methods for addressing the potential 
endogeneity of health status and labor force decisions.  A series of studies estimating 
both reduced form and structural models have also confirmed that health insurance, 
particularly the availability of employer-provided retiree health benefits, raises the 
likelihood of retirement although the magnitude of the effect ranges across studies (see 
the reviews by Currie and Madrian, 1999, and Gruber and Madrian, 2002).  Wealth is 
also a potentially important determinant of retirement, and several recent studies have  
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found positive effects of wealth shocks such as inheritances or the run-up in the stock 
market in the 1990s on actual and anticipated retirement (Holtz-Eakin, Joulfaian and 
Rosen, 1993; Hurd and Reti, 2001; Sevak, 2002).  Other factors that affect retirement 
timing include retirement expectations (Hurd, 1999b), job characteristics (Hurd and 
McGarry, 1993), and mortality risk (Hurd, Smith and Zissimopoulos, 2003).  
In studying the retirement process, researchers have generally not differentiated 
between retirement from the wage and salary sector versus self-employment.  Exceptions 
to this include Fuchs (1982), Quinn (1999), Hochguertel (2005) Parker and Rougier 
(2007), and Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007b).  Fuchs (1982), using the United States 
Retirement History Survey (RHS), finds that the self-employed are more likely to 
continue to work—a differential of 8 percentage points—controlling for demographics, 
job characteristics, health status, pension coverage, and Social Security wealth.  A similar 
result is reported by Quinn (1999) using the more recent HRS. The extent to which other 
determinants of retirement are different for the self-employed versus wage and salary 
workers remains largely unexplored.  Hochguertel’s (2005) cross-sectional analysis of 
preliminary data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE) 
suggests that institutional differences in labor markets and social insurance programs play 
a role in differential retirement behavior from self-employment and wage and salary 
work.  Parker and Rougier (2007) use data from the 1988/1989 and 1994 British 
Retirement Survey and find that while the ‘long-term’ self-employed retire later than 
wage and salary employees, this is not the case for workers who transition into self-
employment at later ages.  This study is one of the first to analyze retirement behavior of 
self-employed workers in Britain but it is based on a small number of observations and an 
older birth cohort that retired more than a decade ago.  Zissimopoulos and Karoly (2007) 
use seven waves of the HRS to examine the extent to which job characteristics influence 
the decision of self-employed workers to exit the labor force and find the long-term self-
employed and those with 6 or more employees are less likely to exit the labor force than 
the more recently self-employed and those with few or no employees.   
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3.   INSTITUTIONAL DIFFERENCES RELEVANT FOR RETIREMENT 
BEHAVIOR IN THE UNITED STATES AND ENGLAND 
Our analysis of data from the HRS and ELSA allow us to exploit institutional 
variation across the United States and the United Kingdom.1  In this section, we review 
key differences in pension systems, disability insurance and other benefits, and health 
insurance—all features that are potentially relevant for understanding differences in 
retirement behavior differences by class of worker within and between the two countries. 
Pension Systems 
The United Kingdom’s pension program is unusual in its mix of public and 
private provision, and in the opportunity for individuals to choose between these 
alternatives.  The system is structured in two tiers. The first tier is provided publicly and 
consists of a flat contributory pension benefit, known as the basic state pension, which is 
augmented by a means-tested component.  Because the benefit is unrelated to earnings, 
once contribution requirements are met, there is no further increase in pension 
entitlement from additional years of work or earnings growth. Benefits are available at 
the state pension ages of 60 for women and 65 for men, regardless of employment status.2  
In the mid 1990s, the basic state pension paid only about 16 percent of average male 
earnings and, because it is has been growing more slowly than male earnings, the percent 
of income it replaces has declined over time (Blundell and Johnson, 1997).  
The second tier, for which participation is mandatory for all employees with 
earnings above a certain floor, requires that individuals either belong to a second, public 
contributory program known as the State Earnings Related Pension Scheme (SERPS) or 
else join a private pension plan.3  The plan can be of the defined benefit (DB) or defined 
contribution (DC) type, and can be individually purchased or collectively provided (e.g., 
by the individual’s employer).  Moreover, individuals can switch between these types of 
                                                 
1 While ELSA covers England only, we discuss institutional and policy differences between the 
United States and the entire United Kingdom.  We note the extent to which there are differences between 
England and the rest of the United Kingdom in the institutional and policy differences we document. 
2 The state pension age for women is scheduled to gradually increase to age 65 between 2010-2011 
and 2020-2021. 
3 A gradual replacement of SERPS by the State Second Pension (SSP) began in 2002.  Once fully 
phased in, the latter will effectively be a flat top-up to the first tier basic state pension, being more generous 
to low earners than SERPS.    
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second tier arrangement during their working lifetime.  Unlike the basic state pension, the 
level of benefits paid by SERPS, or its successor SSP, depends on the individual’s 
earnings history, and thus may be affected by additional years of work. Like the basic 
state pension, there is no earnings test for SERPS or SSP.  Membership in SERPS, for 
example, means that an individual can only receive benefits at the state pension age, 
whereas membership in a company-provided pension plan will typically allow retirement 
before the state pension age, quite often at age 60.  In contrast, a member of an 
individually-purchased defined contribution plan (known as a ‘Personal Pension’) can 
annuitize at any time between ages 50 and 75.   
The self-employed are entitled to the basic state pension as long as they have met 
the contribution requirements, but they are not eligible for SERPS or SSP.  Since the self-
employed typically do not have the option of participating in an occupational pension, 
they must contribute to some form of Personal Pension.  Although some may have 
SERPS entitlement or an occupational pension entitlement from previous wage and 
salary work, the long-term self-employed are much less likely to face significant work 
disincentives through the pension system.  
In contrast to the United Kingdom, the pension system in the United States 
features a single public pension program, known as Social Security. Although a private 
pension system exists alongside the public system, individuals do not have the option of 
participating in one or the other.  While the public part of the U.K. system has a single 
state pension age (which is currently different for men and women), the U.S. system 
permits claiming of benefits at both early and full retirement ages, which are the same for 
both men and women. Currently, the early retirement age is 62 and the full retirement age 
is gradually rising from 65 to 67.  The basic retirement benefit varies by work history and 
age at claiming, but has a progressive structure.  
While most U.K. workers are required to participate in the second tier of pension 
provision through their employers or via Personal Pensions, there is no such requirement 
in the United States.  In practice, about 44 percent of workers are covered by an 
employer-provided pension, a declining share of which are DB plans.  Participation in 
personal savings vehicles such as Individual Retirement Accounts is not mandatory.  
Prior to 2000, U.S. Social Security benefits received at any age were subject to an  
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earnings test, but since then the earnings test applies only to benefits received between 
age 62 and the full retirement age. At present, the benefits of early retirees are reduced by 
$1 for every $2 earned above the annual limit ($11,280 in 2002).  This stands in contrast 
to the United Kingdom where the earnings test was abolished in 1989. 
Unlike the United Kingdom, the self-employed in the United States are entitled to 
participate in the public pension system. Thus, the retirement incentives arising through 
the public system are the same for both classes of workers.  Because wage and salary 
workers are more likely to participate in employer-provided pensions, they are more 
likely to face additional retirement incentives arising from DB pensions, which feature 
early retirement ages that typically precede the Social Security early retirement age, but 
this fraction is gradually declining as employers steadily replace their DB pensions with 
DC schemes, such as 401(k) plans.  Self-employed workers in the United States whose 
businesses are not incorporated are not eligible to participate in 401(k) plans, but may 
contribute to a Self-Employment Plan IRA, which has significantly higher contribution 
limits than 401(k) plans.   
Disability Insurance and Other Benefits 
In the United Kingdom, disability benefits are paid to the long-term sick and 
disabled through a contributory program known as Incapacity Benefit.  Historically, 
benefits were taken-up widely by older nonworkers, and reforms in 1995 were intended 
to significantly tighten eligibility (Blundell and Johnson, 1997).  For example, as of 2001, 
the incapacity benefit is means tested against private pension benefits.  In the United 
States, disability benefits are available through the Disability Insurance (DI) program if 
an individual has worked during five of the past ten years, or through the means-tested 
Supplemental Security Income (SSI) program if they do not qualify for DI.  Although DI 
benefits are not means-tested against assets and non-labor income, benefits are subject to 
an earnings test, whereby recipients who earn more than an indexed earnings ceiling 
($740 per month in 2001) lose eligibility for continued benefits.  DI benefits do not begin 
immediately following the onset of disability; the lengthy application process can be 
initiated only after a five-month waiting period.    
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The presence of several other types of benefits that are explicitly targeted to and 
widely taken up by older individuals in the United Kingdom further distinguishes the two 
countries. Of special note is the U.K. mean-tested Income Support program, where 
beginning at age 60, eligibility no longer depends on demonstrating that one is actively 
seeking work.  Furthermore, Income Support for pensioners was expanded through the 
Minimum Income Guarantee program introduced in 1999.  In addition, individuals 
become eligible for a variety of other benefits at age 60, some of which are means tested. 
Examples include a housing benefit, savings credit (for people with low assets), winter 
fuel payments (not means tested), and a tax credit to offset local tax bills.  Although the 
United Kingdom does not officially designate an early retirement age, the availability of 
other benefits and many occupational pension benefits beginning at age 60 means that 
age 60 functions as a de facto early retirement age for men (Blundell and Johnson, 1997).  
In the United States, means-tested income support is also available to the elderly 
beginning at age 65 through the SSI program, provided Social Security benefits are low 
enough.   
Health Insurance 
The provision of health insurance differs dramatically between the United States 
and the United Kingdom.  Whereas publicly provided universal health insurance is 
available at all ages in the United Kingdom, nearly universal health insurance coverage 
through the Medicare program in the United States begins at age 65.  Generally, 
individuals are fully insured by Medicare if they or their spouse has worked and paid 
taxes into the system for at least ten years.  Eligibility extends equally to wage and salary 
workers and the self-employed, although the self-employed pay twice the contribution 
rate since they are responsible for both the employer and employee shares.  Health 
insurance for the non-elderly is not universal in the United States, but is largely provided 
by employers who purchase insurance through a group insurance market.  Although 
retirement benefits are available from Social Security as early as age 62, Medicare 
benefits are not available until age 65. For those without access to employer-based retiree 
health insurance, this can be a significant deterrent to early retirement.  The self-
employed, who typically do not have access to the group insurance market, can purchase  
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health insurance on the individual market, but they do not benefit from the price 
advantage conferred by group risk pooling. Consequently, the non-elderly self-employed 
are less likely to have health insurance coverage.  
Summary of Institutional Differences  
In sum, the typical wage and salary worker in the United Kingdom participates in 
some kind of DB scheme, either through the state or an employer and faces retirement 
incentives associated with key retirement ages. In contrast, the typical long-term self-
employed worker in the United Kingdom is enrolled in a DC scheme, with no such 
retirement incentives arising at key ages.  Although they do participate in the first-tier of 
the public system, which does not allow benefit claiming until the state pension age, the 
benefit amount is unaffected by additional years of work and replaces a small portion of 
pre-retirement earnings.  While the state pension age for men in the United Kingdom is 
65, the availability of other types of public benefits facilitates early retirement at age 60. 
Because the self-employed face the same eligibility criteria for these other benefits as 
wage and salary workers, benefit availability is unlikely to have a differential effect on 
retirement patterns within the United Kingdom, but the availability of these benefits may 
serve to raise retirement rates relative to the United States.  
In the United States, the differences in the retirement incentives faced by wage 
and salary workers and the self-employed are much less stark.  Both classes of workers 
participate in a DB public pension system.  Wage and salary workers are more likely to 
have an employer-provided DB plan as well, but participation in such plans is far from 
universal.   As a class, the pension arrangements of wage and salary workers are 
becoming more and more similar to those of self-employed workers, as employers phase 
out DB plans in favor of DC plans.   
The lack of universal health insurance coverage in the United States prior to age 
65 suggests that health insurance arrangements are likely to play an important role in the 
United States, unlike the United Kingdom.  Compared to the United Kingdom, job lock 
issues may be particularly important for older wage and salary workers who do not have 
access to retiree health insurance through their employer, causing them to delay 
retirement until they are at least within 18 months of turning 65 and thus eligible to  
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continue their employer coverage until their 65
th birthday.  Because the self-employed 
typically purchase insurance on the individual market as it is, their health insurance 
coverage does not explicitly depend on whether they continue working, although the 
relatively high cost of individual health insurance may effectively prevent retirement 
prior to Medicare eligibility. 
On balance, the differing institutional arrangements in the United States and 
United Kingdom suggest that retirement rates might be higher in the United Kingdom, 
and in both countries, higher among wage and salary workers than among the self-
employed.  We expect some systematic effect of key retirement ages, perhaps most 
strongly for wage and salary workers in the United Kingdom (because private and public 
eligibility ages tend to be coordinated), followed by wage and salary workers in the 
United States, and then the self-employed in the United States.  Key retirement ages 
should affect the self-employed in the United Kingdom least of all, given their low 
likelihood of participating in any kind of DB pension, whether private or public, although 
their potential participation in other public benefit programs makes the effect of key 
retirement age on self-employed workers in the United Kingdom somewhat ambiguous. 
4.   THE HRS AND ELSA DATA  
This research is based on two longitudinal surveys in the United States and 
England designed to examine changes in labor force status, income, wealth and health 
among older individuals.  The HRS, first fielded in 1992, is a U.S. sample of 
approximately 7,600 households (12,654 individuals) with at least one person in the birth 
cohorts of 1931 through 1941 (about 51 to 61 years old at the wave 1 interview in 1992).  
This biennial survey was integrated in 1998 with another biennial survey: The Assets and 
Health Dynamics of the Oldest Old (AHEAD) survey including 6,052 households (8,222 
individuals) with at least one person born in 1923 or earlier (age 70 or over as of the 
wave 1 interview in 1993).  In 1998, the HRS (HRS98) was augmented with baseline 
interviews for a sample from the birth cohorts of 1924 through 1930 (the Children of the 
Depression Era or CODA cohort) and 1942 through 1947 (the War Babies cohort), and 
was representative of all cohorts born in 1947 or earlier.  In 2004, the sample was further 
augmented with the 1948 to 1953 birth cohorts (the Early Baby Boom).  Data from years,  
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1992, 1993, 1994, 1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, 2004 are currently available, although 
this paper relies only on the 2002 and 2004 waves (comparable to the time period 
covered by ELSA).   
The ELSA is modeled on the HRS and designed to facilitate cross-national 
analyses of aging by collecting comparable data on labor force transitions, health, wealth, 
and other demographic and job characteristics.  The ELSA survey sample is drawn from 
respondents to the Health Survey for England (HSE).  The HSE is a study conducted 
jointly by the Department of Epidemiology and Public Health, University College 
London, and the National Centre for Social Research, on behalf of the Department of 
Health. Approximately 12,000 respondents from three separate years of that survey 
(1998, 2000 and 2001) were recruited to provide a representative sample of the English 
population aged 50 or over at baseline.  Because the ELSA sampling source is the HSE, 
baseline data on respondents’ health have been collected and were supplemented by 
collection of economic data in the first wave of ELSA in 2002. The second wave of data 
collection took place in 2004 and both waves of data are publicly available and used in 
this analysis. All waves are conducted using face-to-face interviews.   
The ELSA survey instrument has been constructed to be as comparable as 
possible to the HRS within the constraints of institutional differences between the 
countries. As a result, direct comparisons between the surveys are possible in many 
domains of economic and health measures. The analysis is conducted using weighted 
data to account for any bias due to non-random non-response in ELSA and in the HRS, in 
addition, to account for over-sampling of certain groups.   HRS and ELSA include the 
following measures central to our research: workforce status, including whether the 
individual is self-employed or not; pensions from current and previous jobs and private 
pensions including plan details such as normal and early retirement ages; household 
wealth including information on assets and their values; and earnings. The surveys also 
provide other pertinent information for the study of self-employed older workers:  
demographic, health, and job characteristics.  For married couples, the surveys collect 
these data on both individuals. The following discussion focuses on the measures most 
important to our study.  Because of the similarity in survey design, we focus on a 
description of the HRS data, noting differences with ELSA when relevant.   
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Labor Force Status and Class of Worker 
In each wave, respondents are asked if he or she is currently working for pay 
(HRS) or did any paid work in the last month (ELSA).  The transition from working for 
pay in one wave to not working for pay in the next is our outcome of interest.4 In terms of 
employment class, workers in each baseline interview are asked whether they are 
currently self-employed in their main job, and if so, how long they have been self-
employed (i.e., tenure on the current job), and whether they work with their spouse (HRS 
only) and/or other employees (HRS and ELSA).5  This information is updated at each 
subsequent interview wave.  We use the employment history information in both surveys 
to further classify self-employed respondents according to whether they became self-
employed before or after age 50. 
Household Wealth and Income 
HRS has a comprehensive set of questions to measure household wealth. Assets 
were separated into the following eleven categories: other real estate; vehicles; business 
equity; IRA or Keogh accounts; stocks or mutual funds; checking, savings or money 
market funds; CD's, government savings bonds or treasury bills; other bonds; other 
assets; and other debt.  Housing equity is collected separately.  HRS has pioneered 
methods such as unfolding brackets (Juster and Smith, 1997) to improve the quality of 
wealth measures in household surveys, methods that have been adopted in ELSA. As a 
result of these data quality efforts, HRS is now widely regarded as providing the best 
measurement of wealth in household surveys that lack a high-income over-sample.  In 
collecting income data, similar methods are used.  Household income in both surveys 
includes income from (self and spouse) labor earnings, capital, pensions, public programs 
and other sources.   
                                                 
4 There are other data available to examine labor force transitions between waves including self-
reports of retirement and labor force status.  These measures, however, tend to be more subjective and may 
have different meanings across countries.   Future work will examine changes in “usual hours of work per 
week,” which may be considered objective and commonly defined across countries. 
5 We explored other definitions of self-employment including self-employment in a second job, as 
well as part-time and full-time self-employment, as defined by report of self-employment income and as 
defined by reports of business ownership although results from this analysis are not included in this paper.  
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Pensions 
One focus of this study is how public and private pensions affect labor force 
transitions of older self-employed and wage workers. The surveys ask respondents if they 
have employer and/or private pensions, type of pension, normal and early retirement ages 
associated with these pensions.  In the HRS and ELSA, employer pensions are reported 
as being of a type where benefits are tied to age or years of service as is typical of DB 
plans or as being a DC type of plan.  In ELSA, respondents also report whether they 
participate in other private pensions such as private personal pensions, group personal 
pensions, stakeholder pensions, S226 plans (self-employed personal pension), retirement 
annuity pensions, and other retirement savings.  For comparability of pensions in the 
United States and England, we classify all DC pensions in HRS and ELSA and the other 
private pensions reported in ELSA as DC.   In our analysis, we use pension eligibility 
ages to model DB pension incentives.  Although DB pension wealth can be constructed 
for the HRS sample using restricted Social Security earnings records, no such files are yet 
available for ELSA.   
Health Insurance 
In prior research, as noted above, access to health insurance has been shown to be 
correlated with self-employment rates in the United States.  In the United States, there is 
no universal coverage through the public system with the exception of individuals age 65 
and older through Medicare.  In the HRS, respondents are asked if they are covered by 
health insurance and type (employer, spouse’s employer, government or other) and if this 
health insurance covers retirees, up to age 65.  There is no parallel questioning in ELSA 
because the public health care system is universal. 
5.   DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF SELF-EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYMENT 
TRANSITIONS   
We begin our analysis of the HRS and ELSA data by tabulating, for the two 
countries, the characteristics of the self-employed versus their wage and salary 
counterparts. For this analysis, we restrict the 2002 cross-sectional samples in the HRS 
and ELSA to workers who are ages 55 to 70 so we analyze the same age cohort in the  
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two countries.  We conclude this section with a descriptive analysis of employment 
transitions between the 2002 and 2004 HRS and ELSA survey waves.  
Characteristics of the Self-Employed 
Table 2 reports self-employment rates for workers age 55 to 70 in 2002 in the 
United States and England, in total and separately for males and females.  Overall 22 
percent of older U.S. workers are self-employed compared with 20 percent in England.  
In both countries, the self-employment rate is higher for men than for women, but the 
female-male gap in the relative odds of being self-employed is smaller for U.S. women 
compared with their English counterparts. 
Table 2 also shows differences in the composition of the self-employed for the 
two countries, in total and by gender, where the self-employed are classified by age of 
self-employment and by the nature of self-employment.  In the United States, a higher 
share of the self-employed is self-employed before age 50 (as opposed to at or after age 
50) compared with workers in England (68 versus 57 percent).  Men are more likely to be 
longer-term self-employed in both countries, but as with self-employment rates overall, 
the male-female gap in age of self-employment is smaller in the United States than it is in 
England.  The composition of the self-employed, defined in terms of the presence of 
employees, is considerably different in the United States and England.  Whereas 61 
percent of the U.S. self-employed are in businesses with employees (other than their 
spouse), that figure is just 20 percent in England.6  Self-employed men are more likely to 
have employees in both countries, but the female-male gap is higher in the United States, 
in part because the fraction with employees is so much lower in England, for both men 
and women. 
To explore differences in the characteristics of self-employed workers, Table 3 
provides tabulations of several key demographic and economic variables for the HRS and 
ELSA samples for wage and salary workers versus the self-employed.   The 
characteristics include the proportion male, married, foreign born, and working part time; 
                                                 
6 The percentage of self-employed workers in England with employees among the non-missing 
observations is approximately 14% lower than that reported in the U.K. census for England and Wales.  
However, respondents in the unclassified group are likely to have employees because their income and 
wealth are on average similar to self-employed respondents with employees.   
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and the distribution by age group, self-reported health status, and quartiles of income and 
wealth (where the quartiles are defined separately for the entire HRS and ELSA samples).  
A comparison of the two countries overall (tabulations not shown) indicates that, 
compared with workers in England ages 55 to 70, workers in the United States in the 
same age range are less likely to be male, married, or working part time.  They are 
somewhat more likely to be foreign born and considerably more likely to self-report that 
they are in “excellent” health.  They are on average older and drawn from families with 
higher income but not higher wealth. 
For both the United States and England, compared with wage and salary workers, 
the self-employed are more likely to be male and distributed toward older ages.  While 
the U.S. self-employed are somewhat more likely to be married and foreign born 
compared with their wage and salary counterparts, the reverse is true for England.   A 
higher fraction of U.S. self-employed workers self-report that their health is “excellent” 
compared with U.S. wage and salary workers, yet self-reported health status varies little 
between self-employed and wage and salary workers in England.  U.S. self-employed 
workers are also considerably more likely to work part time compared with wage and 
salary workers (32 versus 17 percent), whereas the share working part time is identical 
(35 percent) for the two groups of workers in England and approximately equal to that of 
self-employed workers in the United States.  The higher percentage of part-time wage 
workers in England compared to the United States is largely driven by high numbers of 
part-time female workers in England.  Indeed, among males, the percentage of part-time 
wage and salary workers is low in both countries (12 percent in the United States and 16 
percent in England).   Finally, the self-employed in the United States are distributed 
toward the higher end of the income and wealth distribution compared with wage and 
salary workers.  In England, this relationship also holds for the wealth of the self-
employed but not their income. 
Relevant for retirement decisions in the U.S. is access to health insurance before 
age 65 when Medicare coverage begins.  Among wage and salary workers under the age 
of 65, 60 percent have employer provided health insurance, another 16 percent have 
employer provided insurance with retiree benefits until age 65, and 26 percent have 
insurance provided through a spouse’s employer or some other source (including public  
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sources) with no retiree benefits and 6 percent have none of the above (Table 4).  Among 
self-employed workers under the age of 65, fewer have these benefits:  38 percent have 
insurance through their work, only two percent also have retiree benefits, and 50 percent 
have insurance through another source including one’s spouse and publicly provided 
sources and 15 percent have none of these sources (Table 4).7   
Given the institutional differences between the United States and England, we 
might expect differences in access to private pension coverage in the two countries, as 
well as variation in the type of pension coverage and the associated behavioral incentives.  
Table 5 shows the pension coverage rate on the current job for wage and salary and self-
employed workers in the two countries, as well as for all workers.8  Overall, the pension 
coverage rate is slightly higher for England compared with the United States:  56 versus 
52 percent.  The contrast is much sharper, however, by class of worker.  While 39 percent 
of the self-employed in England are covered by a pension on the current job, that rate is 
just 12 percent for the self-employed in the United States. In England, 96 percent of the 
self-employed with a pension report that it is a DC plan.  In the United States, of the 12 
percent of self-employed workers with a pension, 64 percent have a DC plan.   
Figures 1 and 2 illustrate the variation across countries for all workers, and 
separately for workers by employment class, in the normal retirement age (NRA) and 
early retirement age (ERA) associated with their employment-based pension plan. Nearly 
half of wage and salary workers in England face an NRA of 65, while the NRA is 60 for 
nearly all other workers (Figure 1). In contrast, the NRA for U.S. workers is much less 
concentrated.  Modal ages in descending frequency are 65, 62 and 55 with most of the 
remaining portion distributed between the age of 56 and 59. Variation is evident as well 
in the ERA as shown in Figure 2.  Again, most English workers are concentrated in a few 
ages:  60, 55 and 50. Modal points in the ERA distribution for U.S. workers include ages 
55 and 62. 
                                                 
7 The percentages add to slightly more than 100 because the types are not mutually exclusive. 
8 The pension plan variables are defined for the first pension described by the respondent.   
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Labor Force Exits 
We use the longitudinal aspect of the HRS and ELSA data to analyze exits from 
the labor force by class of worker that occur between the 2002 and 2004 survey waves.   
Figure 3 displays the age pattern of these transitions for workers in the United 
States and England defined by employment class at time t (i.e., 2002).  The age 
categories, defined as of time t+2 (i.e., 2004), are grouped into two-year intervals (with 
the exception of age 64) to reduce some of the noise in the age pattern because of small 
cell sizes in single-year age groups.  As seen in Figure 3, the likelihood of moving to 
retirement generally increases with age in each country for both wage and salary and self-
employed workers.  In England (lines plotted with solid lines and open symbols), the 
transition rates are higher at each age for wage and salary workers compared with their 
U.S. counterparts, and, in most cases, the transition rates are higher at each age for the 
self-employed too.  For both countries, the transition rates are higher (or the same in the 
case of the United States) at each age for wage and salary workers compared with the 
self-employed.  The impact of age of eligibility for public benefits is evident in the mean 
transition rates.  In the U.S., the likelihood of exiting the labor force for both wage and 
salary and self-employed workers rises by 7 percentage points if they reach age 62 
between waves.  If they reach age 65 between waves, exits rise by 10 percentage points 
for wage and salary workers but there is no increase for self-employed workers.  This 
suggests that the age 65 incentives are much stronger for wage and salary workers than 
self-employed workers in the U.S., consistent with the presence of health-insurance 
related job lock for the majority (60 percent, Table 4) of wage and salary workers.9  In 
England, we expect the incentives to retire at key ages to be much stronger for wage and 
salary workers than for self-employed workers compared to the U.S.  Indeed, we find that 
among workers reaching the key ages of 60 and 65 in England between waves, wage and 
salary workers are much more likely to exit than self-employed workers (11 versus 6 
percentage points at age 60 and 19 versus 12 percentage points at age 65).  
                                                 
9 Public and private age-65 pension incentives are unlikely to be the explanation since both wage 
and salary and self-employed workers in the United States face the same set of incentives through the 
Social Security system, and only 6 percent of all wage and salary workers have a private pension in which 
age 65 is a key retirement age.  
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6.  REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF RETIREMENT TRANSITIONS  
In this section, we estimate a retirement transition model for England and the 
United States. We begin by describing the model specification, identification 
assumptions, and continue with a discussion of our findings and associated simulations. 
Model Specification 
We use a linear probability model to estimate the probability of exiting the labor 
force (defined as not working for pay) by 2004 conditional upon working for pay in 2002. 
We estimate a pooled model for all workers, but fully interact all covariates with 
indicators for country and class of worker (i.e., self-employed in the United States, wage 
and salary in the United States, self-employed in England, wage and salary in England).  
Our results may be interpreted as causal only if two identifying assumptions hold: 1) 
workers in the United States and England have similar underlying preferences for work 
and leisure (although the institutions constraining their decisions may vary), and 2) the 
self-employment (wage and salary) decision is not jointly chosen with anticipated 
retirement age based on age of eligibility for retirement benefits.  The first assumption is 
not testable; however, it often implicitly underlies cross-national analyses of this type 
(e.g., Gruber and Wise, 1999).  The latter assumption is more likely to hold for 
individuals who became self-employed at relatively younger ages, as a substantial 
literature suggests that most retirement planning occurs after age 50.10  We assess the 
plausibility of this assumption by estimating our transition models both for the full 
sample of self-employed respondents, and also for the subsample who became self-
employed before age 50, and for whom the self-employment decision may be more 
plausibly predetermined.     
We model institutional incentives using the age-eligibility structure of private and 
public benefits. Although this approach uses less variation than if we had pension wealth, 
our flexible age structure picks up the nonlinearities in pension wealth that likely affect 
behavior without relying on less desirable variation in pension wealth owing to past 
earnings. Our focus is on how age eligibility for public benefits affects the probability of 
                                                 
10 For example, in the HRS, Lusardi (2003) finds that about half of non-retired respondents 51 and 
older have thought little or not at all about retirement.  
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exiting the labor force.  We use age measured in 2004 (t+2) to determine benefit 
eligibility (Age04).  To allow for a flexible age structure and for slope and intercept shifts 
at the ages of early and standard eligibility for public pensions we include in the model a 
quadratic in age in 2004, an indicator of eligibility for early public pension benefits 
(Age04_PEA), an indicator of eligibility for standard (normal) public pension benefits 
(Age04_PNA) and interactions of these indicator variables with the quadratic in age.  For 
example, in the United States, the age of eligibility for early and reduced public old age 
pension benefits is 62 thus Age04_PEA is equal to one for workers who are 62, 63 or 64 
in 2004.  Similarly, Age04_PNA is equal to one for workers who are 65 and older.  
Although the age of eligibility for full benefits ranges between 65-67, depending on birth 
year, no worker in our sample eligible for full benefits at age 66 or older reaches those 
ages by 2004.11  In England, we follow the conventional wisdom that for all practical 
purposes, the age of eligibility for early old age public pension benefits is age 60 for both 
female and male workers and the standard age of eligibility is 65 for male workers.12   
We model the age structure of incentives arising through private pensions by 
defining private pension eligibility ages relative to the public eligibility ages (PEA or 
PNA).  Specifically, we include indictor variables for if the worker has a defined benefit 
or defined contribution private or employer pension.  For those with defined benefit 
plans, workers are grouped into mutually exclusive categories by whether the early and 
normal retirement ages (ERA and NRA, respectively) for the plan coincide with the 
eligibility ages for public pension benefits.  For example, in the United States a worker 
with a defined benefit plan is categorized in one of 6 ways: early and normal retirement 
ages are less than age 62 (ERA & NRA < PEA); early retirement age is less than age 62 
and normal age is 62 to 64 (ERA<PEA, NRA ≥ PEA & <PNA); early retirement age is 
less than age 62 and normal age is 65 or older (ERA<PEA, NRA≥PNA); early retirement 
age is 62 to 64 and normal age is 62 to 64 (ERA & NRA≥PEA, ERA & NRA<PNA); 
early retirement age is 62-64 and normal age is 65 or older (ERA≥PEA & <PNA, 
NRA≥PNA; early retirement age and normal retirement age are both at 65 or older (ERA 
                                                 
11 The maximum full retirement age faced by respondents in our sample (b. 1932-1947) is 66 
although no one in the cohort that is entitled to benefits at age 66 actually becomes 66 from 2002 to 2004.  
12 As described earlier, age 60 is not an official age for early benefits for male workers but in 
practice, there are many paths for early retirement through the public system at age 60.  
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& NRA ≥ PNA).  Four additional categories are generated for those with missing data on 
the ERA or NRA for a total of 10 mutually exclusive and exhaustive categories.  For 
male English workers with a defined benefit plan, these categories are less than age 60, 
60 to 64 and 65 and older, and less than age 60 and 60 and older for female workers, 
corresponding to the age of public benefit receipt in England.  Finally, these categorical 
indicators are interacted with the indicators of whether the worker is currently eligible for 
early public benefits (Age04_PEA) and for standard public benefits (Age04_PNA).    
Another important benefit that becomes available at age 65 in the United States is 
health insurance coverage through the Medicare program.  This eligibility may be 
particularly important for self-employed workers who may delay retirement until they 
have access to this benefit.  In the model we include indicator variables for four types of 
health insurance at time t: employer provided without retiree benefits, employer provided 
with retiree benefits, benefits through a spouse, and other insurance. We interact these 
insurance types with an indicator for Medicare eligibility at t+2; thus before age 65 the 
employer insurance categories refer to primary coverage, but after 65 they may refer to 
either primary or secondary coverage.13  To identify the effect of health insurance on 
retirement behavior, we assume that employment decisions in the United States are not 
made on the basis of whether or not an employer offers retiree health insurance. 
Finally, we control for many other observable differences between workers in the 
U.S and England and between classes of worker (self-employed or wage and salary) that 
prior research has found and theory has indicated affect the likelihood of exiting the labor 
force:  sex, marital status, self-reported health status, financial and housing wealth and 
total household income.   Wealth and income are entered as interacted quartiles, with the 
second and third quartiles combined, and the quartile definitions are country specific.   
Model-based Age-specific Exit Rates 
The results of our full model are shown in Table 6. Owing to the large number of 
interaction terms, individual coefficients are difficult to interpret; therefore we illustrate 
                                                 
13 If an employer with 20 or more employees provides health insurance coverage to regular 
employees, then the employer is primary payer for regular employees age 65 and older and Medicare is 
secondary payer. If an employer does not offer coverage to regular employees, has fewer than 20  
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our key results by showing how variation in pensions and health insurance arrangements 
(in the U.S.) affect the age profiles in labor force exit rates.  
Figure 4 shows the predicted percentage of workers from England and the United 
States exiting the labor force from ages 55 to 70 based on our model, letting the 
indicators for early and standard eligibility take on the value of one at the appropriate 
ages, and holding all other covariates at their mean values.  Variation in eligibility for 
public pensions alone generates age profiles in predicted transition rates that capture 
several notable features of the data.  Consistent with observed exit rates, the model 
predicts higher exit rates for wage and salary workers than for self-employed workers in 
both countries.  We expect that in England, the self-employed would be less responsive to 
the entitlement ages of 60 and 65 than wage and salary workers because they are not 
eligible for 2
nd tier public benefits and the replacement rate for 1
st tier benefits is small.  
Recall that in both the 1
st tier and the public portion of the 2
nd tier, eligibility ages are 60 
for women and 65 for men, but that age 60 is treated as a de facto early retirement age for 
men.  Furthermore, wage and salary workers who opt out of second tier public provision 
often have employer provided DB plans with early and normal retirement ages at 60 and 
65. The model predicts that the exit rate for wage and salary workers in England 
increases dramatically from 16.3 percent at age 55 to 25.8 at age 59.  The exit rates 
increase by nearly 5 percentage points from age 59 to age 60. In contrast, the predicted 
percentage of self-employed workers exiting the labor force in England is fairly constant 
from ages 55 to 59, increasing from 19.7 to just 20.4 and increasing 3 percentage points 
from ages 59 to 60.  Exit rates increase 18 percentage points from age 64 to the standard 
retirement age of 65 for wage and salary workers and 14 percentage points for self-
employed workers.  This latter effect is somewhat surprising, since self-employed 
workers in England cannot participate in the public DB system, and do not have private 
DB plans.  Previewing results presented later, this spike is primarily driven by more 
recently self-employed workers who have potentially spent many years participating in 
the 2
nd tier public DB system, SERPS, and who consequently may be eligible to claim 
significant pension benefits at age 65.  Comparing the model’s predicted exit rates with 
                                                                                                                                                
employees, or the individual is not classified as a regular employee, then Medicare is the primary payer 
(Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services, 2005).  
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observed exit rates we find that controlling for observable characteristics decreases some 
of the difference in exit rates at key ages between the classes of workers in England but 
substantial differences remain.  Indeed, likelihood ratio tests reject the null-hypothesis 
that the coefficients on the standard age of eligibility are zero for wage and salary 
workers but cannot reject the null for self-employed workers in England.  The null is 
rejected for all workers with respect to the coefficients on eligibility for early benefits.  
In the United States, self-employed and wage and salary workers are part of the 
same pension system unlike in England where the self-employed are not part of the 2
nd 
tier of the system.  In the United States, however, for most respondents in our sample the 
standard eligibility age for pension benefits coincides with the age for public coverage of 
health insurance through Medicare.  This may be a particularly important benefit for self-
employed workers who do not have access to retiree health insurance benefits through an 
employer before the age of 65.  As described above, we include an interaction with 
eligibility for age-65 Medicare benefits in 2004 (t+2) and type (if any) of health 
insurance benefits in 2002.  For example, workers without health insurance benefits will 
not have any particular incentive to wait until age 65 to retire relative to those with health 
insurance but no retiree benefits.   
As seen in Figure 4, the predicted age-pattern of exits from the labor force is 
similar for both classes of workers in the U.S. although at all ages, wage and salary 
workers exit the labor force at higher rates than self-employed workers.  The predicted 
percentage of workers exiting the labor force rises slowly for wage and salary workers, 
from 13.1 percent at age 55 to 19.7 percent at age 61, and then increases 4.3 percentage 
points at age 62. The percentage of self-employed workers exiting the labor force rises 
from 8.6 percent at age 55 to 18.9 percent at age 61 and increases by only 1 percentage 
point at age 62 to 20.1.  For wage and salary workers in the U.S. the percentage of 
workers exiting the labor force increases by 17 percentage points between age 64 and 65 
but less than one-half percentage point for self-employed workers.  Compared to the 
observed rates of exit, controlling for observable differences between self-employed and 
wage and salary workers increases exit rates between the classes at age 62 and the ‘raw’ 
differences at age 65 remain.  Likelihood ratio tests reject the null-hypothesis that the  
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coefficients on the standard age of eligibility are zero for wage and salary workers but not 
for self-employed workers.   
As noted earlier, the second identifying assumption is more likely to hold for the 
long-term self-employed than for all self-employed; therefore, we also estimate the model 
using the long-term self-employed (those self-employed before age 50), rather than all 
self-employed.  Table 7 shows the predicted probability of exiting the labor force at each 
age for long-term self-employed workers in the United States and England along with the 
results for wage and salary workers (from Figure 4) with all covariates for both samples 
held at their mean values.  At nearly all ages, exit rates are lower for the long-term self-
employed than for all self-employed, but the rate of change in the exit rates is similar at 
the early eligibility ages in both countries, and also at the standard eligibility ages in the 
U.S.  While the age 61 to 62 increase in exits appears more pronounced for the long-term 
self-employed compared to all self-employed workers in the U.S., the effect of early 
eligibility is not statistically different than zero for these long-term workers—the same 
result as for all workers.  
Interestingly, the effect of crossing the standard eligibility age (age 65) is 
substantially smaller for long-term self-employed workers in England which is to be 
expected given the lack of financial incentive provided by the public system for self-
employed workers, who are not eligible for second tier benefits, and who are unlikely to 
also have a prior DB plan through an employer.  Thus it appears that those workers who 
became self-employed after age 50, who may have second tier benefits from prior wage 
and salary work and perhaps a DB pension from a prior employer, primarily drive the 
observed spike at age 65 for self-employed workers in England.  Although the jump is 
greatly diminished, it does not vanish entirely, which in the absence of an earnings test 
associated with claiming of public benefits suggests the presence of liquidity constraints 
or social norms affecting all workers.  In sum, although the age specific labor force exit 
patterns are somewhat different for the long-term self-employed compared to all self-
employed workers, we find, as we did in models including all self-employed workers, 
that the increase in retirement at the standard age of eligibility is larger for wage and 
salary workers and statistically different than zero only for wage and salary workers.   
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Our next set of analyses examines the extent to which pension systems and health 
insurance can explain the age specific patterns.  Previewing the next sets of results, the 
patterns are consistent with a hypothesis that self-employed workers’ exit rates reflect 
their relatively unconstrained choices, or non-age specific incentives relative to wage and 
salary workers.  
 
The Effect of Health Insurance  
Access to non-employer provided health insurance benefits (or retiree benefits for 
wage workers) in the United States increases the percentage of workers exiting the labor 
force at all ages. We test for the joint-significance of the pre-65 health insurance 
coefficients in Table 6 and find they are jointly significant for self-employed workers but 
not wage and salary workers.  Figure 5 shows the predicted exit rates if all U.S. workers 
had access to health insurance prior to age 65 through a spouse, other non-employer 
insurance, or retiree benefits, with all other characteristics held at their mean and 
indicators for eligibility for standard and early public benefits taking the value of one at 
the appropriate age.   Under the scenario that all U.S. workers have access to non-
employment related health insurance, pre-65 exit rates rise substantially, and the gap in 
exit rates between the self-employed and wage and salary workers virtually disappears. 
For self-employed workers, exit rates prior to age 65 rise by 8 percentage points and at 
age 65 and older, by 14 percent.  For wage and salary workers, exit rates rise by 6 
percentage points and 3 percentage points below and above age 65, respectively.  This 
pattern suggests that not only is job lock an important phenomenon for U.S. wage and 
salary workers, but that it is perhaps even more important for self-employed workers, 
albeit through a different mechanism.  Whereas wage and salary workers may need to 
keep working in order to maintain their access to heavily subsidized coverage, the self-
employed may need to work in order to afford the expense of individually-purchased 
health insurance or self-insurance.  It is somewhat surprising that after age 65, exit rates 
for both types of workers rise, and relatively more so for the self-employed.  After 65, 
virtually all workers have access to Medicare, thus the simulation depicted in the graph 
refers to the addition of supplemental health insurance coverage for all workers, not 
primary coverage.  While the rise in exit rates suggests that out-of-pocket medical  
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expenditure risk is important, it is not clear why it would be relatively more important for 
the self-employed than for wage and salary workers.  One hypothesis is that the removal 
of an important background risk would have a stronger impact on the self-employed 
because they are likely exposed to greater financial risk than wage workers.  
Access to non-employer provided health insurance explains some of the 
difference in exit rates between self-employed workers in the U.S. and England.  For self-
employed workers with access to health insurance through a spouse or other non-
employment related access, the predicted difference in exit rates at ages less than 62 falls 
from 8-11 percentage points to less than 4 percentage points.   When we constrain the 
sample of self-employed workers in both countries to those who became self-employed 
before age 50, we find there is no difference in exit rates at age 65 and older among the 
self-employed in the U.S. and England (Table 8).  Prior to 65, however, predicted exit 
rates for the long-term self-employed in the U.S. are substantially higher than those of the 
long-term self-employed in England.   
The Effect of Private Personal and Employer Provided Pensions  
Private pensions, particularly those that are defined benefit, are likely to influence 
the age at which a worker chooses to retire.  As Figure 1 revealed, the normal retirement 
age for these plans more often than not, coincides with the ages of eligibility for public 
benefits thereby strengthening the incentive to retire at the key public benefit ages.  In 
contrast, defined contribution plans are characterized by a lack of incentive to retire at 
particular ages. Approximately 64 percent of all wage and salary workers in the United 
States have a pension and among those with a pension, 62 percent have the defined 
benefit type.  In England, 61 percent have a pension and among those with a pension, 49 
percent have a defined benefit type of plan.  In contrast, almost no self-employed workers 
have defined benefit pension plans through a current job.  In England, however, 39 
percent of all self-employed workers have a defined contribution plan, while in the 
United States only 12 percent of self-employed workers have a private pension plan.  We 
use this variation between self-employed and wage and salary workers and workers in the 
United States and England to examine the extent to which eligibility for early and  
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standard private pension benefits affects a worker’s decision to exit the labor force in the 
United States and England.    
As described earlier, our specification for pensions is quite detailed, including an 
indicator for having a DC pension, 10 indicators for type of DB pension (6 indicators 
defined according to how the early and standard eligibility ages relate to the public 
eligibility ages, plus an additional 4 for missing values), and interactions between the 10 
DB types and age.  Table 6 shows that for self-employed workers in both countries, 
having a DC pension is negatively associated with exiting the labor force relative to 
having no pension.  The same is true for wage and salary workers in both countries.  The 
effect of DB pensions, however, depends on the eligibility ages for early and standard 
benefits and the age of the worker.  For wage and salary workers in England, the effect of 
having a pension is substantially larger than for wage and salary workers in the United 
States.  To assist in interpreting the level effect of private pensions on exit rates in the 
United States and England and by class of worker we consider two types of pension 
arrangements and graph the predicted percentage of workers exiting the labor force under 
each scenario.  In the first, wage and salary workers in both countries have only DC 
pensions (Figure 6).  In the second, wage and salary workers in both countries have DB 
pension benefits with ages of eligibility for early and standard retirement benefits that 
correspond with the ages of eligibility in the public system and for self-employed 
workers, retirement probabilities are held at the mean values (Figure 7).  For example, in 
the United States, we graph predicted exit rates for wage and salary workers who have a 
DB pension plan with early benefits at age 62 and standard benefits at age 65. All other 
characteristics are held at their mean values and indicators for standard and early public 
benefits take the value of one at the appropriate age.   
Under the scenario such that wage workers in both countries have only DC 
pensions (Figure 6), in the United States, wage workers decrease their rate of exit from 
the labor force by 5 percentage points at ages less than 65 and 10 percentage points at 
ages 65 and older, thereby narrowing the difference in exit rates between self-employed 
and wage and salary workers.  In England, assuming wage workers have a DC private 
pension plan decreases exit rates at each age by just under 11 percentage points bringing 
the rates in line with those of the self-employed at ages 60 and older.    
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Under the scenario such that the DC pension indicator for self-employed workers 
is held at its mean value and all wage and salary workers have DB private pension 
benefits with coordinated retirement ages, we find a very large effect on exits from the 
labor force at the early and standard retirement age (Figure 7).   This large increase in the 
percentage of wage and salary workers exiting the labor force at these key ages 
dramatically increases the difference in exit rates between the two classes of workers in 
both countries and closes the gap in exit rates of wage and salary workers in the United 
States and England at ages 62 and 65.   
Together, Figures 6 and 7 suggest an important role for private pension 
arrangements in driving the within and across country differences in exit rates.  The 
change in exit rates across these two extremes—all wage workers with DB coverage v. 
all wage workers with DC coverage—illustrate the potential long-term effect on exit rates 
as employers continue their steady replacement of DB plans with DC plans.  
7.   CONCLUSIONS 
Retirement rates are higher in England than in the United States and also higher 
among wage and salary workers than among the self-employed in both countries.  One 
plausible explanation for these differences is the varying age specific institutional 
arrangements in the United States and United Kingdom that differentially impact workers 
of different employment classes.  In the United States, we find that health insurance 
coverage is important for understanding differences in the probability a self-employed 
worker and a wage and salary worker exits the labor force.  We find that before age 65, 
having access to health insurance through a spouse or having retiree benefits, which few 
self-employed workers have, increase the probability of exiting the labor force and if 
applied to self-employed workers, their rates of exit would be at or above those of wage 
and salary workers and similar to those of self-employed workers in England prior to age 
65.  Indeed, access to non-employment linked health insurance increases exit rates of 
U.S. self-employed workers by 8 percentage points at ages less than 65 and thereby 
decreases the difference in exit rates between self-employed workers in the U.S. and 
England from between 9 and 18 percentage points (depending on age) to less than 4  
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percentage points at all ages less than 65.  Among long-term self-employed workers, the 
gap is completely eliminated. 
Being eligible for a private, defined benefit pension plan is almost exclusively a 
characteristic of wage and salary workers in both countries, and often these plans have 
eligibility ages tied to age of eligibility for public benefits.  Access to DB plans and the 
age structure of their benefits serve to exacerbate the inter-country difference in labor 
force exit rates of self-employed and wage and salary workers.  Indeed, in both countries, 
predicted exit rates by class of worker are almost identical if all workers are constrained 
to DC pensions only (no DB pensions).  The persistent increase in exit rates at age 65 in 
England for workers with only DC pension plans suggests the existence of either liquidity 
constraints or social norms.  That is, because there is no earnings test in the public DB 
pension system, we would not expect a spike at age 65 for workers without private DB 
pension plans with a normal retirement age at 65.  
Examining the change in age-specific labor force exit rates of older self-employed 
workers in the U.S and England, who face no employer imposed constraints, and 
comparing them to their wage and salary counterparts as well as to each other serves to 
illustrate the importance of access to health insurance and age-eligibility requirements of 
pension systems in influencing an individual’s decision of when to retire.  The results 
suggest that in the United States, the availability of Medicare at age 65 limits the 
proportion of workers willing to work past 65 but that the movement of employers away 
from defined benefit pension plans is likely to encourage work at older ages.  
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Table 1—Rates of Self-Employment among Older Workers by Age in 12 Countries 
(percentage) 
  Age group 
Country  50 to 55  56 to 59  60 to 64  65 and above 
Austria  16.1  19.9  35.1  50.4 
Denmark  8.0  11.8  17.9  25.9 
England  16.4  16.6  20.0  39.9 
France  12.4  10.8  22.2  47.3 
Germany  14.3  14.7  19.9  38.1 
Greece  36.1  40.2  50.1  61.6 
Italy  29.6  36.4  58.0  71.5 
Netherlands  12.5  11.7  30.2  43.7 
Spain  26.3  33.1  28.5  68.0 
Sweden  13.3  11.5  14.5  36.2 
Switzerland  17.8  24.4  33.0  59.1 
United States  18.6  18.5  22.8  36.5 
NOTE:  Response rates differ across the SHARE countries.  The rate is especially low in 
Switzerland (38 percent) so the figures for that country should be interpreted with caution.  
Percentages have been calculated using HRS, ELSA, and SHARE sampling weights.   
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using HRS 2002 and wave 1 of ELSA and SHARE.  
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Table 2—Rates of Self-Employment and Distribution by Self-Employment Category 
in the HRS and ELSA 
(percent distribution) 
    Self-employed 
  All workers   
By age of  
self-employment 
  By presence of 
employees 




employed   
Before 
age 50 
At or after 
age 50 




United States  78.1  21.9    67.8  32.2    38.9  61.1 
Males  73.4  26.6    69.8  30.2    18.1  81.9 
Females  83.2  16.8    64.1  35.9    48.6  51.4 
England  80.3  19.7    56.9  43.1    80.2  19.8 
Males  75.4  24.6    60.0  40.0    78.9  21.1 
Females  86.7  13.3    49.7  50.3    83.1  16.9 
NOTE:  Sample is individuals age 55 to 70.  Sample size for HRS is 4,491 and for ELSA is 2,349.  Percentages 
have been calculated using HRS and ELSA sampling weights.   Missing observations for U.S as follows:  3 workers 
unclassified by class; 13 self-employed workers not classified by age; 27 self-employed workers not classified by 
presence of employees.  Missing observations for England as follows: 27 workers unclassified by class; 8 self-
employed workers not classified by age; 50 self-employed workers not classified by presence of employees.  The 
percentage of self-employed workers in England with employees among the non-missing observations is approximately 
14% lower than as reported in the U.K. census for England and Wales.  Respondents in the unclassified group are 
likely to have employees because their income and wealth are on average similar to those self-employed with 
employees.    
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 waves of HRS and ELSA.  
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Table 3—Worker Characteristics by Employment Class in the HRS and ELSA 
(percent distribution) 
  United States    England   









Male  49.5  63.8     52.7  70.3    
Age group             
55 to 59  54.6  43.4    62.6  51.0   
60 to 61  16.3  14.5    14.0  12.5   
62 to 64  13.9  17.2    14.5  16.6   
65 to 70  15.3  25.0    8.9  20.0   
Married  70.5  74.7    77.0  74.1   
Foreign born  8.3  8.9    6.5  6.2   
Health status             
Excellent  17.1  25.3    9.0  10.9   
Very good  38.0  34.7    34.3  36.7   
Good  31.8  29.0    39.5  37.4   
Fair  11.3  9.6    15.2  13.3   
Poor  1.8  1.4    2.0  1.7   
Works part time  17.1  32.1     35.1  35.2    
Income             
Quartile 1 (low)  6.7  10.6    7.0  12.7   
Quartile 2  15.8  11.8    15.1  17.5   
Quartile 3  30.5  21.0    33.0  27.3   
Quartile 4 (high)  47.0  56.7    44.9  42.6   
Wealth             
Quartile 1 (low)  20.0  11.5    15.8  8.7   
Quartile 2  28.4  13.4    26.6  16.8   
Quartile 3  27.9  25.8    29.1  25.8   
Quartile 4 (high)  23.7  49.3    28.5  48.7   
Sample size (N)  3,480  1,006     1,906  466 
 
NOTE:  Sample is individuals age 55 to 70.  Percentages have been calculated using HRS and 
ELSA sampling weights.   
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 waves of HRS and ELSA. 
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Table 4—Health Insurance Coverage of Workers Under Age 65 by Employment 
Class in the HRS  
(percent distribution)  
  United States 
  Wage and salary  Self-employed 
Employer provided, no retiree benefits  59.7  37.8 
Employer provided, retiree benefits  16.3  1.8 
Spousal benefits  16.0  24.6 
Other source (incl. government)  9.6  25.7 
None  6.2  15.3 
Sample size (N)  2,551  557 
NOTE:  Sample is individuals age 55 to 70. Percentages have been calculated using HRS sampling 
weights.  Insurance types are not mutually exclusive and thus do not add to 100 percent. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 wave of HRS. 
 
Table 5—Pension Coverage by Employment Class and Self-Employment Category 
in the HRS and ELSA 
(percent distribution)  
  United States    England 






employed   
All 




employed   
All 
workers 
Has pension on current job  63.5  11.9    52.1    60.8  39.2    56.4 
Pension type given that have a pension                   
Defined contribution  42.6  63.7    43.7    44.9  95.8    51.8 
Defined benefit  35.3  13.6    34.2    44.2  2.5    38.4 
Both  19.0  9.1    18.5    4.0  1.0    3.5 
Don’t know  3.1  13.6    3.7    7.0  1.0    6.3 
Sample size (N)  3,446  996     4,442     1,897  464     2,361 
NOTE:  Sample is individuals age 55 to 70.  Percentages have been calculated using HRS and ELSA sampling 
weights. In the HRS (ELSA), 34 (9) wage and salary workers and 10 (2) self-employed workers have missing values 
for pension ownership.  
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 waves of HRS and ELSA.  
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Table 6—Regression Results for Labor Force Exits in the HRS and ELSA,  
Fully Interacted Model by Employment Class and Country 
  United States  England 
  Self-employed  Wage  Self-employed  Wage 
  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E. 
Class of worker & country intercept  17.247  11.261  5.014  4.816  2.938  16.312  10.046  7.109 
Demographics, self-reported health:                 
Male  -0.028  0.025  -0.002  0.013  -0.049  0.038  -0.033  0.018 
Married  0.011  0.029  0.003  0.016  0.049  0.037  0.014  0.018 
Health status [good]                 
Health excellent/very good  -0.025  0.025  -0.029  0.014  -0.050  0.033  -0.050  0.016 
Health fair/poor  0.064  0.036  0.046  0.020  0.096  0.048  0.092  0.021 
Wealth & Income quartiles [Q2Q3]                 
Wealth Q1, Income Q1  0.207  0.061  0.043  0.033  0.042  0.092  0.083  0.041 
Wealth Q1, Income Q2Q3  0.091  0.053  -0.027  0.020  0.007  0.074  -0.036  0.027 
Wealth Q1, Income Q4  0.121  0.082  -0.100  0.040      -0.046  0.044 
Wealth Q2Q3, Income Q1  0.081  0.054  -0.020  0.037  0.067  0.068  0.104  0.041 
Wealth Q2Q3, Income Q4  -0.068  0.037  -0.027  0.018  -0.028  0.050  -0.011  0.021 
Wealth Q4, Income Q1  -0.115  0.092  0.232  0.132  0.053  0.079  0.036  0.066 
Wealth Q4, Income Q2Q3  -0.029  0.042  0.035  0.030  -0.097  0.050  0.026  0.032 
Wealth Q4, Income Q4  -0.066  0.031  -0.040  0.020  -0.008  0.043  -0.006  0.022 
Private pensions (none):                 
Has DC pension   -0.070  0.050  -0.052  0.017  -0.116  0.035  -0.127  0.020 
    Has DB pension w/benefit age
1                 
P1. ERA & NRA < PEA      0.080  0.033      -0.007  0.132 
P2. ERA < PEA, NRA ≥ PEA & < PNA      -0.111  0.062      -0.043  0.034 
P3. ERA < PEA, NRA ≥ PNA      0.015  0.056      -0.056  0.054 
P4. ERA and NRA ≥ PEA & < PNA,       -0.008  0.078      -0.143  0.062 
P5. ERA ≥ PEA & < PNA, NRA ≥ PNA      0.103  0.094      -0.075  0.075 
P6. ERA and NRA ≥ PNA      0.046  0.091         
P7. Missing ERA, NRA < PEA      0.019  0.075      -0.096  0.094 
P8. Missing ERA, NRA ≥ PEA & < PNA      -0.049  0.125      -0.122  0.031 
P9. Missing ERA, NRA ≥ PNA      -0.090  0.103      -0.141  0.052 
P10. Missing ERA & NRA      -0.054  0.034      -0.071  0.040 
DB type*indicator if PEA≤age’04≤PNA 
(Age04_PEA)                 
P1* Age04_PEA      0.040  0.072         
P2* Age04_PEA      0.190  0.106      -0.067  0.079 
P3* Age04_PEA      0.010  0.111      0.006  0.105 
P4* Age04_PEA      0.287  0.080      0.215  0.108 
P5* Age04_PEA      0.013  0.106      -0.043  0.126 
P6* Age04_PEA      -0.037  0.098         
P7* Age04_PEA      0.052  0.167         
P8* Age04_PEA      0.014  0.204      0.234  0.060 
P9* Age04_PEA      0.053  0.204      0.002  0.094 
P10* Age04_PEA      0.058  0.058      0.075  0.080 
DB type*indicator if PNA≤age ’04 
(Age04_PNA)                 
P1* Age04_PNA      -0.140  0.074         
P2* Age04_PNA      0.378  0.145         
P3* Age04_PNA      0.014  0.137      0.012  0.187 
P4* Age04_PNA      0.328  0.086         
P5* Age04_PNA      0.229  0.135      -0.055  0.213 
P6* Age04_PNA      0.131  0.092         
P7* Age04_PNA      0.120  0.166         
P8* Age04_PNA      0.290  0.305         
P9* Age04_PNA      0.083  0.157      0.189  0.124 
P10*Age04_PNA      0.018  0.051      0.272  0.147  
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Table 6—Regression Results for Transition to Retirement in the HRS and ELSA,  
Fully Interacted Model by Employment Class and Country, Continued 
  United States  England 
  Self-employed  Wage  Self-employed  Wage 
  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E.  Coeff.  S.E. 
Age and age interactions:                 
Age04  -0.609  0.393  -0.178  0.169  -0.098  0.587  -0.369  0.256 
Age04 squared  0.005  0.003  0.002  0.001  0.001  0.005  0.003  0.002 
Indicator if PEA ≤ age’04 ≤ PNA 
(Age04_PEA)  -80.280  212.786  28.615  111.079  -7.660  16.744  -13.593  7.227 
Age04_PEA*Age04  2.634  6.757  -0.860  3.528  0.231  0.597  0.466  0.259 
Age04_PEA*Age04-squared  -0.022  0.054  0.006  0.028  -0.002  0.005  -0.004  0.002 
Indicator if PNA ≤ age’04 (Age04_PNA)   -17.885  11.430  -2.985  5.235  3.979  17.331  -2.567  8.586 
Age04_PNA*Age04  0.623  0.397  0.129  0.178  -0.085  0.608  0.165  0.289 
Age04_PNA*Age04-squared  -0.005  0.003  -0.001  0.002  0.000  0.005  -0.002  0.002 
Health insurance and RHB:                 
Employer HI no RHB and Age04<65  -0.002  0.048  0.001  0.025         
Spousal HI and Age04<65  0.078  0.050  0.035  0.027         
Other HI and Age04<65  0.087  0.048  0.059  0.029         
Employer HI with RHB and Age04<65      0.011  0.030         
Employer HI w/out RHB and Age04 65+  -0.012  0.035  -0.023  0.023         
Spousal HI and Age04 65+  0.059  0.049  -0.007  0.036         
Other HI and Age04 65+  0.070  0.046  -0.006  0.031         
Employer HI with RHB and Age04 65+      0.088  0.049         
NOTES:  Columns do not represent separate equations, but rather coefficients refer to the covariate in each row interacted with a variable for 
the country and class indicated in the column heading. Results based on fully interacted model.  Sample size is 8,989.  Model R-squared is 0.315.  
Indicates coefficient is statistically significant at the ***1 percent, **5 percent, and *10 percent level. 
(1) Few self-employed workers in the U.S. report having DB plans thus the categories of type by age of early and normal benefits are 
collapsed to two categories with coefficients (standard errors) as follows: ERA & NRA <PEA -0.119 (0.060); ERA or NRA at PEA or PNA -0.011 
(0.120). 
(2) PEA=Public early eligibility age, PNA=Public normal (standard) eligibility age, ERA=Early retirement age of private pension, 
NRA=Normal retirement age of private pension, RHB=Retiree health benefits. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA. 
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  Table 7—Predicted Percentage of Workers Exiting Labor Force Between Waves by  
Employment Class and Age Began Self-Employment Work in the HRS and ELSA 
 
  United States  England 
  Self-employed  Wage & Salary  Self-employed  Wage & Salary 
Age  Before Age 50  All  All  Before Age 50  All  All 
55  6.41  8.62  13.05  9.86  19.71  16.29 
56  5.44  7.64  13.35  9.97  19.61  17.64 
57  5.29  7.74  13.97  11.17  19.68  19.67 
58  5.95  8.92  14.93  13.48  19.93  22.40 
59  7.43  11.17  16.20  16.88  20.35  25.81 
60  9.73  14.51  17.81  21.49  23.45  30.48 
61  12.84  18.93  19.74  23.70  26.53  33.62 
62  18.46  20.07  24.08  25.78  29.45  36.64 
63  14.72  19.87  21.04  27.74  32.19  39.56 
64  16.49  16.42  19.63  29.59  34.76  42.37 
65  11.67  16.78  36.43  37.19  48.84  60.37 
66  11.22  17.81  36.13  36.61  47.48  59.79 
67  11.00  18.83  35.90  36.32  46.38  59.51 
68  11.00  19.84  35.74  36.31  45.53  59.54 
69  11.22  20.85  35.65  36.57  44.95  59.86 
70  11.66  21.85  35.64  37.12  44.62  60.49 
NOTES: Results for column ‘All’ based on predictions from fully interacted model given in Table 6.  Sample size is 8,989.  Model R-squared 
is 0.315.  Results for columns ‘Before Age 50’ based on predictions from fully interacted model with self-employed workers who became self-
employed before age 50 and all wage workers.  Sample size is 8,203.  Model adjusted R-squared is 0.313. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA. 
 
 
Table 8—Predicted Percentage of Self-Employed Exiting Labor Force Between Waves by  
Age Began Self-Employment in the HRS and ELSA: Assuming U.S. Self-Employed Have 
Access to Health Insurance Benefits Through Spouse or Non-employment Source 
  U.S.: Self-employed  England: Self-employed 
Age  Before age 50  All  Before age 50 
55  22.16  16.64  9.86 
56  21.19  15.66  9.97 
57  21.04  15.76  11.17 
58  21.70  16.94  13.48 
59  23.18  19.20  16.88 
60  25.48  22.53  21.49 
61  28.59  26.95  23.70 
62  34.21  28.09  25.78 
63  30.47  27.89  27.74 
64  32.24  24.44  29.59 
65  36.74  30.78  37.19 
66  36.29  31.81  36.61 
67  36.07  32.83  36.32 
68  36.07  33.84  36.31 
69  36.29  34.85  36.57 
70  36.73  35.85  37.12 
NOTES: Results for column ‘All’ based on predictions from fully interacted model given in Table 6.  Sample size is 8,989.  Model R-squared 
is 0.315.  Results for columns ‘Before Age 50’ based on predictions from fully interacted model with self-employed workers who became self-
employed before age 50 and all wage workers.  Sample size is 8,203.  Model adjusted R-squared is 0.313. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA.  
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Figure 1—Pension Plan NRA for Wage Workers in the HRS and ELSA 
 
NOTE:  Sample is individuals age 55 to 70.  Percentages have been calculated using HRS and ELSA sampling weights.   
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 waves of HRS and ELSA. 
 
Figure 2—Pension Plan ERA for Wage Workers in the HRS and ELSA 
 
NOTE:  Sample is individuals age 55 to 70.  Percentages have been calculated using HRS and ELSA sampling weights.   
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 waves of HRS and ELSA.  
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Figure 3—Observed Percentage Exiting Labor Force Between Waves by  
Employment Class in the HRS and ELSA 
   
NOTE:  Results are plotted for individuals age 55 to 70 in 2002.  Percentages have been calculated using HRS and ELSA 
sampling weights.   
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA. 
 
Figure 4—Predicted Percentage Exiting Labor Force Between Waves by  
Employment Class in the HRS and ELSA 
   
 
NOTE:  Predicted probabilities based on regression results reported in Table 6. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA.  
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Figure 5—Predicted Percentage Exiting Labor Force Between Waves by  
Employment Class in the HRS and ELSA: Assuming U.S. Workers Have Access to Non-
employer Provided Health Insurance Benefits or Retiree Benefits 
   
 
NOTE:  Predicted probabilities based on regression results reported in Table 6. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA. 
 
Figure 6—Predicted Percentage Exiting Labor Force Between Waves by  
Employment Class in the HRS and ELSA: Wage Workers Have DC Pensions 
 
NOTE:  Predicted probabilities based on regression results reported in Table 6. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA. 
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Figure 7—Predicted Percentage Exiting Labor Force Between Waves by  
Employment Class in the HRS and ELSA:  Assuming All Wage and Salary Workers Have 
DB Pensions with ERA and NRA at Public Benefit Ages 
 
NOTE:  Predicted probabilities based on regression results reported in Table 6. 
SOURCE:  Authors' calculations using the 2002 and 2004 waves of HRS and ELSA 
 
 